Repeated contracting without commitment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Breig, Zachary
• 署名单位: University of Queensland
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105514
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: commitment; mechanism design; posted prices; RENEGOTIATION; Spot contracting

摘要

I study a dynamic model of monopoly sales in which a monopolist without commitment power interacts with a consumer whose valuation is private. I characterize equilibria of this game and show how the seller's strategy varies with initial beliefs. I find that the seller's payoffs under spot contracting can be higher than under commitment with renegotiation and that random delivery contracts can improve payoffs beyond posted prices.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.