CONTINUOUS STRATEGY GAMES AS LOCATION GAMES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
KNOBLAUCH, V
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1039
发表日期：
1995
页码：
224-237
关键词：
摘要：
Every symmetric, constant-sum, two-person game with strategy set [0, 1] and payoff functions that are continuous off the diagonal is a location game. Location game versions can therefore be used to analyze games not usually thought of in geometric terms. By way of illustration, a location game version is used to provide geometric insights into a Cournot duopoly game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.