Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Serizawa, S
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1089
发表日期：
1995
页码：
599-608
关键词：
摘要：
We study the preference domain where voting by committees of Barbera et nl. (S. Barbera, H. Sonnenschein, and L. Zhou, Voting by committees, Econometrica 59 (1991), 595-609) is strategy-proof in an extended model. ''Cross-shaped'' preference is a generalization of separable preference of Barbera et al. We show that if a scheme of voting by committees without a dummy voter is strategy-proof on some rich domain, then any preference of a voter is cross-shaped on some set. The width of such set depends on his power. As a corollary, we have that the cross-shaped domain is the maximal one where voting by committees is strategy-proof except for ''extreme'' cases. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.