A SIMPLE FORECASTING MECHANISM FOR MORAL HAZARD SETTINGS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
ARYA, A; GLOVER, J
署名单位：
Carnegie Mellon University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1051
发表日期：
1995
页码：
507-521
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies a multiagent moral hazard setting. We resolve the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting while employing a solution concept that makes less demanding behavioral assumptions than Nash. A simple mechanism is constructed that approximately implements the second-best solution in two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies. Under our mechanism, the agents' best-reply correspondences are well defined, a small message space is employed, and the messages can be interpreted as divisional forecasts. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.