D1 signaling equilibria with multiple signals and a continuum of types
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ramey, G
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0066
发表日期：
1996
页码：
508-531
关键词：
摘要：
This note extends Cho and Sobel's (J. Econ. Theory 50 (1990), 381-413) existence and uniqueness results for D1 equilibria of signaling games with multiple signals by (i) specifying that types are drawn from a compact interval, and (ii) invoking a more general incentive monotonicity condition, due to Engers (Econometrica 55 (1987), 663-674) which extends the usual single-crossing property of one-signal models. For certain classes of payoff functions, the complete-information distortion result of Bagwell and Ramey (Rand J. Econ. 19 (1988), 59-71) is shown to hold in D1 equilibria of the continuum-type model. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.