Optimal contract, imperfect output observation, and limited liability
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Lawarree, JP; VanAudenrode, MA
署名单位：
Laval University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0131
发表日期：
1996
页码：
514-531
关键词：
摘要：
We study the optimal contract when output is imperfectly observed. When all parties are risk neutral and the agent has unlimited liability, the optimal contract remains the same regardless of whether the output is perfectly or imperfectly observed. When the agent's liability becomes limited, the optimal contract changes profoundly under imperfect information. We show that the hi,oh-productivity agent never produces at first-best and may be required to produce an effort lower than the one required from the low-productivity agent, and both types of agents can earn rents. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.