Dynamic consequences of stabilization policies based on a return to a gold standard

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Paal, B
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2766
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 143-186
• 关键词: war finance; gold suspension and resumption; welfare consequences of inflation and deflation

摘要

Prior to the 1930's rapid inflations often occurred in conjunction with wartime Finance, and were commonly halted by imposing or re-imposing a gold standard. In a general equilibrium framework I study the consequences of different methods of gold resumption for the dynamic path of the economy, including the behavior of the price level and the welfare of economic agents. In particular, I examine the implications of varying (a) the length of time between the end of the war and the return to gold; (b) the par at which gold convertibility is re-established; and (c) whether or not the government accumulates gold reserves over an extended period of time before the stabilization. I show that a gradual post-war deflation, which permits resumption of gold convertibility as scheduled, can occur even if the money supply is not contracted and the government does not actively accumulate gold reserves. Furthermore, different policy choices regarding the resumption plan affect not only the speed of postwar deflation, but also the speed of the wartime inflation. In terms of welfare, I find that wartime generations unanimously prefer rapid resumption at high parity, while among postwar generations borrowers and lenders often have opposing interests, but on average they tend to benefit from delaying resumption and devaluing the currency. (C) 2001 Academic Press.