Potential games with continuous player sets
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Sandholm, WH
署名单位：
University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2696
发表日期：
2001
页码：
81-108
关键词：
摘要：
We study potential games with continuous player jets, a class of games characterized by an externality symmetry condition. Examples of these games include random matching games with common payoffs and congestion games. We offer a simple description of equilibria which are locally stable under a broad class of evolutionary dynamics, and prove that behavior converges to Nash equilibrium from all initial conditions. We consider a subclass of potential games in which evolution leads to efficient play, Finally, we show that the games studied here are the limits of convergent sequences of the finite player potential games studied by Monderer and Shapiey [22]. (C) 2001 Academic Press.