Limited commitment, money, and credit

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jafarey, S; Rupert, P
• 署名单位: University of Liverpool; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2712
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 22-58
• 关键词: money; credit; private information

摘要

This paper studies limited commitment and adverse selection in an economy in which private liabilities (inside money I can be used as instruments of intertemporal trade. The results suggest that in conjunction with adverse selection, the limited commitment problem may affect the behavior of intrinsically higher quality debtors more severely than loader quality ones. Nonetheless, a credit economy may function better when both problems are present than under limited commitment alone. Adding a fixed amount of money eases frictions associated with the credit market. (C) 2001 Academic Press.