Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Compte, O; Jehiel, P
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00103-0
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 334-342
• 关键词: voluntary contributions; sunk contributions; asymmetry; gradualism

摘要

We revisit Admati and Perry (1991)'s model of voluntary contributions to a joint project. Their main result that equilibrium contributions are small appears not to be robust to the introduction of asymmetries. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.