Private information revelation in common-value auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mares, V; Harstad, RM
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00012-7
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 264-282
• 关键词: Auctions; public information; Information revelation; Linkage principle

摘要

When a seller has information that could help bidders to estimate asset value, a dictum of auction theory has been that all such information should be publicly announced to bidders. The possibility of privately revealing this information to one or more bidders is introduced. Seller in some circumstances may attain higher expected revenue through revealing his information privately. Examples show that the role of private revelation is more complex than simply generating bidder asymmetry. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.