Large market games with demand uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peck, J
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00022-X
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 283-299
• 关键词: demand uncertainty; market game; trading post

摘要

We consider a market game with a continuum of consumers, where the measure of each type is stochastic. Nature selects the set of active consumers, who make bids and offers on l - 1 spot market trading posts. Existence of type-symmetric Nash equilibrium is proven. When facing price uncertainty, best responses are unique, and a Nash equilibrium to the sell-all game is typically not a Nash equilibrium to the original game. Under plausible circumstances, consumers strictly prefer to be on one side of the market. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.