Softening competition through forward trading

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Mahenc, P; Salanié, F
署名单位:
INRAE; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Perpignan Via Domitia
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN:
0022-0531
DOI:
10.1016/j.jet.2003.07.009
发表日期:
2004
页码:
282-293
关键词:
forward market Bertrand competition
摘要:
In the history of alleged manipulations on forward markets, it has been observed that high prices resulted from a cartel's long positions. The present paper addresses this issue in a simple model of price setting duopolists. We show that forward trading results in producers buying forward their own production, so that equilibrium prices are increased compared to the case without forward trading. This result contrasts with the social desirability of forward markets emphasized by the academic literature. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.