A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moro, A; Norman, P
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00165-0
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 1-30
• 关键词: statistical discrimination; INEQUALITY; specialization; human capital

摘要

We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The interact-on between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize. Discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dominant group gains from discrimination, rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination. The model is also consistent with reverse discrimination as a remedy against discrimination since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve parity. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Science (USA).