Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shachat, J; Walker, M
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; International Business Machines (IBM); IBM USA
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00125-X
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 280-309
• 关键词: Bayesian learning; experiments; Heterogeneity

摘要

We describe an experiment based on a simple two-person game designed so that different learning models make different predictions. Econometric analysis of the experimental data reveals clear heterogeneity in the subjects' learning behavior. But the subjects follow only a few decision rules for basing their play on their information, and these rules have simple cognitive interpretations. There is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and many equilibria in mixed strategies. We find that the only equilibrium consistent with the data is one of the mixed strategy equilibria. This equilibrium is shown, surprisingly, to be consistent with Jordan's Bayesian model. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Science (USA).