Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Herings, PJJ; Peeters, RJAP
• 署名单位: Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.10.001
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 32-60
• 关键词: Game theory; stochastic games; computation of equilibria; linear tracing procedure

摘要

This paper introduces an algorithm to compute stationary equilibria in stochastic games that is guaranteed to converge for almost all such games. Since in general the number of stationary equilibria is overwhelming, we pay attention to the issue of equilibrium selection. We do this by extending the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games, called the stochastic tracing procedure. As a by-product of our results, we extend a recent result on the generic finiteness of stationary equilibria in stochastic games to oddness of equilibria. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.