Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aoyagi, Masaki
• 署名单位: University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.016
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 61-92
• 关键词: Collusion; auction; COMMUNICATION; Bid rotation

摘要

This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. For independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values, the paper identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders' payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.