-
作者：Jackson, Matthew O.; Kremer, Ilan
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Stanford University
摘要：We analyze bidding behavior in large discriminatory-price auctions in a common value setting where the number of objects is a non-trivial proportion of the number of bidders. We show that the average price paid in the auction is biased downward from the expected value of the objects, even in the competitive limit. We show that conditional on a signal that falls below a threshold, a bidder bids no more than the expected value of an object conditional on the signal and winning; while conditional...
-
作者：Manellia, Alejandro M.; Vincent, Daniel R.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer's valuation for those objects. The seller's problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller's problem can always be found in an extreme point of the feasible set. We identify the relevant extreme points, and faces of the feasible set. We provide a simple algebraic procedure to determine whether a mechanism is an extreme point. We characterize...
-
作者：Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents' effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of thei...
-
作者：Berentsen, Aleksander; Camera, Gabriele; Waller, Christopher
作者单位：University of Basel; Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Notre Dame
摘要：In monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained. This problem creates a role for financial intermediaries, such as banks, who accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans. In general, financial intermediation improves the allocation. The gains in welfare come from the payment of interest on deposits and not from relaxing borrowers' liquidity constraints. We a...
-
作者：Cadenillas, Abel; Cvitanic, Jaksa; Zapatero, Fernando
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Alberta; University of Southern California
摘要：We consider first-best risk-sharing problems in which the agent can control both the drift (effort choice) and the volatility of the underlying process (project selection). In a model of delegated portfolio management, it is optimal to compensate the manager with an option-type payoff, where the functional form of the option is obtained as a solution to an ordinary differential equation. In the general case, the optimal contract is a fixed point of a functional that connects the agent's and th...
-
作者：Matsushima, Hitoshi
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：We investigate the collective decision with incomplete information and side payments. We show that a direct mechanism associated with the social choice function that satisfies budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality exists for generic prior distributions. We consider the possibility that a risk-averse principal extracts full surplus in agency problems with adverse selection. With regard to generic prior distributions, we show that there exists a modified d...
-
作者：Zhu, Tao; Wallace, Neil
作者单位：Cornell University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：A new theory of coexistence of money and higher-return assets is set out. It applies to any setting in which some trade involves an exchange of goods for assets and occurs between two people-a buyer and a seller. We show that there exists a function mapping the portfolios of the buyer and the seller to the trade that occurs such that (i) the trade is in the buyer-seller core and (ii) some people are induced to enter the buyer-seller meeting with money. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Futagami, Koichi; Iwaisako, Tatsuro
作者单位：University of Osaka; Ritsumeikan University
摘要：In this paper, we explore the dynamic properties of an endogenous growth model with finite patent length. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium growth path and that this path exhibits damped oscillations in contrast to the equilibrium path of an endogenous growth model with infinite patent length. We also examine the effects of patent policy on social welfare and show that infinite patent length does not maximize social welfare. Furthermore, we show that, in a growth model that does n...
-
作者：Charness, Gary; Jackson, Matthew O.
作者单位：Stanford University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments on Stag Hunt games, we find a stark contrast between how groups and individuals play, with payoffs playing a primary role in equilibrium selection when individuals play, but the structure of the voting rule playing the primary role when group...
-
作者：Chen, Yan; Katuscak, Peter; Ozdenoren, Emre
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This study presents a laboratory experiment of the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values, where the distribution of bidder valuations may be unknown. In our experimental setting, in first price auctions, bids are lower with the presence of ambiguity. This result is consistent with ambiguity loving in a model that allows for different ambiguity attitudes. We also find that the first price auction generates significantly higher revenue than the second price a...
