A three way equivalence
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Koutsougeras, Leonidas C.; Ziros, Nicholas
署名单位:
University of Manchester; Universite Catholique Louvain
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN:
0022-0531
DOI:
10.1016/j.jet.2007.06.004
发表日期:
2008
页码:
380-391
关键词:
strategic market games
core
COMPETITION
摘要:
In view of the well known core equivalence results in atomless economics, coincidence of market game equilibrium allocations with competitive allocations is tantamount to a three way equivalence between market game mechanisms, competitive equilibria and the core. Based on this idea we study equilibrium refinements of market games, which allow us to use the core equivalence machinery in order to provide an exact market game characterization of competitive equilibria. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.