Uniform selection in global games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chassang, Sylvain
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.07.010
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 222-241
• 关键词: Global games; equilibrium selection; uniform selection; comparative statics; endogenous games

摘要

This paper brings together results which are required in order to extend the global games approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. More precisely, it shows that the selection argument of Carlsson and van Damme [Global games and equilibrium selection, Econometrica 61(5) (1993) 989-1018] holds uniformly over appropriately controlled families of games. Those results also give proper justification for the inversion of limits which is often implicit in applied work taking comparative statics on the selected risk-dominant equilibrium. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.