Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cabrales, Antonio; Calvo-Armengol, Antoni
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Autonomous University of Barcelona; ICREA
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.003
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 99-113
• 关键词: Contract theory; mechanism design; envy; social preferences; skill segregation

摘要

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely selfish preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in different firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are close. This result holds for a broad class and distribution of social preferences. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.