A characterization of consistent collective choice rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bossert, Walter; Suzumura, Kotaro
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.05.004
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 311-320
• 关键词: collective choice rules; Consistency; Pareto rule

摘要

We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference, which excludes the possibility of a money pump. The properties of collective choice rules used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.