Restricted feedback in long term relationships

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Doraszelski, Ulrich; Escobar, Juan F.
• 署名单位: Universidad de Chile; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.013
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 142-161
• 关键词: Repeated games; Restricted feedback; Product choice game

摘要

This paper studies long term relationships, modeled as repeated games, with restricted feedback. Players condition current play on summary statistics of past play rather than the entire history, as may be the case in online markets. Our state strategy equilibrium framework allows for arbitrary restrictions on strategies. We derive a recursive characterization for the set of equilibrium payoffs similar to that of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) [2,3] for perfect public equilibria and show that the set of equilibrium payoffs is the largest fixed point of a monotone operator. We use our characterization to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient trade in a repeated product choice game where costumers condition their purchase decisions only on the last performance signal. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.