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作者：Heinsalu, Sander
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：This paper proves the Li (2009) [13] unawareness structure equivalent to the single-agent propositionally generated logic of awareness of Fagin and Halpern (1988) [4]. For any model of one type one can construct a model of the other type describing the same belief and awareness. Li starts from an agent unable to perceive aspects of the world and distinguish states, modeled with subjective state spaces coarser than the objective state space. Fagin and Halpern limit the agent's language or cogni...
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作者：Benigno, Pierpaolo; Woodford, Michael
作者单位：Columbia University; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：We consider a general class of nonlinear optimal policy problems with forward-looking constraints, and show how to derive a problem with linear constraints and a quadratic objective that approximates the exact problem. The solution to the LQ approximate problem represents a local linear approximation to optimal policy from the timeless perspective proposed in Benign and Woodford (2004, 2005)[6,7], in the case of small enough stochastic disturbances. We also derive the second-order conditions f...
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作者：Duggan, John; Kalandrakis, Tasos
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities, and we assume preferences and the status quo are subject to arbitrarily small shocks. We prove that equilibrium continuation values are differentiable and that proposal strategies are continuous almost everywhere. We...
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作者：Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper proposes and studies a tractable subset of Nash equilibria, belief-free review-strategy equilibria, in repeated games with private monitoring. The payoff set of this class of equilibria is characterized in the limit as the discount factor converges to one for games where players observe statistically independent signals. As an application, we develop a simple sufficient condition for the existence of asymptotically efficient equilibria, and establish a folk theorem for N-player pris...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This introduces the symposium on economic growth. (C) 2012 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Bonn
摘要：We study a notion of locally robust implementation that captures the idea that the planner may know agents' beliefs well, but not perfectly. Locally robust implementation is a weaker concept than ex-post implementation, but we show that no regular allocation function is locally robust implementable in generic settings with quasi-linear utility, interdependent and bilinear values, and multi-dimensional payoff types. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Eeckhout, Jan; Jovanovic, Boyan
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA; New York University
摘要：The rise in world trade since 1970 has been accompanied by a rise in the geographic span of control of management and, hence, also a rise in the effective international mobility of labor services. We study the effect of such a globalization of the world's labor markets. The world's welfare gains depend positively or. the skill-heterogeneity of the world's labor force. We find that when people can choose between wage work and managerial work, the worldwide labor market raises output by more in ...
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作者：Said, Maher
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：A seller has an uncertain number of perishable goods to sell in each period. Privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to the market. Buyers are risk neutral, patient, and have persistent private values for consuming a single unit. We show that the seller can implement the efficient allocation using a sequence of ascending auctions. The buyers use memoryless strategies to reveal all private information in every period, inducing symmetric behavior across different cohorts. We extend our r...
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作者：Bester, Helmut; Kraehmer, Daniel
作者单位：University of Bonn; Free University of Berlin
摘要：This paper analyzes bilateral contracting in an environment with contractual incompleteness and asymmetric information. One party (the seller) makes an unverifiable quality choice and the other party (the buyer) has private information about its valuation. A simple deterministic exit option contract, which allows the buyer to refuse trade, achieves the first-best in the benchmark cases where either quality is verifiable or the buyer's valuation is public information. But, when unverifiable and...
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作者：Grant, Simon; Kajii, Atsushi; Polak, Ben; Safra, Zvi
作者单位：University of Queensland; Rice University; Kyoto University; Yale University; Yale University; University of Exeter; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show what additional axiom is necessary and sufficient for the observer to exhibit aversion to ex post inequality. We also relate this axiomatization to our axiomatization in a companion paper of generalized utilitarian social welfare functions. Given certain richness assumptions, the on...
