Prizes and patents: Using market signals to provide incentives for innovations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chari, V. V.; Golosov, Mikhail; Tsyvinski, Aleh
• 署名单位: Yale University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.04.004
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 781-801
• 关键词: innovations; mechanism design; patents; prizes; Economic growth

摘要

We consider environments in which agents other than innovator receive the signals about the quality of innovation. We study whether mechanisms can be found which exploit market information to provide appropriate incentives for innovation. If such mechanisms are used, the innovator has incentives to manipulate market signals. We show that if an innovator cannot manipulate market signals, then the efficient levels of innovation can be uniquely implemented without deadweight losses for example, by using prizes. Patents are necessary if the innovator can manipulate market signals. For an intermediate case of costly signal manipulation, both patents and prizes may be optimal. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.