Implementation with partial provability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ben-Porath, Elchanan; Lipman, Barton L.
• 署名单位: Boston University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.017
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1689-1724
• 关键词: Implementation; hard evidence; mechanism design

摘要

We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence. We show that a simple condition on evidence is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences (including state dependent) with at least three agents if the social planner can perform small monetary transfers beyond those called for by f. If transfers can be large, f can be implemented in a game with perfect information when there are at least two players under a boundedness assumption. For both results, transfers only occur out of equilibrium. The use of evidence enables implementation which is robust in the sense that the planner needs little information about agents' preferences or beliefs and agents need little information about each others' preferences. Our results are robust to evidence forgery at any strictly positive cost. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.