A more general theory of commodity bundling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Armstrong, Mark
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.004
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 448-472
• 关键词: Price discrimination; bundling; discrete choice; oligopoly; common agency

摘要

This paper discusses the incentive to bundle when consumer valuations are non-additive and/or when products are supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, a firm has an incentive to introduce a bundle discount when demand for the bundle is more elastic than the overall demand for products. When separate sellers coordinate on a bundle discount, they can use the discount to relax competition, which can harm welfare. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.