On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chatterji, Shurojit; Sanver, Remzi; Sen, Arunava
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; Istanbul Bilgi University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1050-1073
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; Restricted domains; Semi-single-peaked domains

摘要

In this paper, we investigate domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982) [13]. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.