-
作者：Daley, Brendan; Green, Brett
作者单位：Duke University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We consider a signaling model in which receivers observe both the sender's costly signal as well as a stochastic grade that is correlated with the sender's type. In equilibrium, the sender resolves the trade-off between using the costly signal versus relying on the noisy grade to distinguish himself. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition loosely, that the grade is sufficiently informative relative to the dispersion of (marginal) signaling costs across types under which the presence of...
-
作者：Geromichalos, Athanasios; Simonovska, Ina
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study optimal portfolio choice in a two-country model where assets represent claims on future consumption and facilitate trade in markets with imperfect credit. Assuming that foreign assets trade at a cost, agents hold relatively more domestic assets. Consequently, agents have larger claims to domestic over foreign consumption. Moreover, foreign assets turn over faster than domestic assets because the former have desirable liquidity properties, but represent inferior saving tools. Our mecha...
-
作者：Kurmann, Andre
作者单位：Drexel University
摘要：This paper considers a decentralized capital market characterized by trading frictions in which firms and suppliers need to make investment decisions before meeting with each other and bargaining over the price of capital. The resulting holdup problem provides firms with a strategic incentive to overaccumulate capital so as to reduce their marginal productivity and thus the bargained price. In equilibrium, this strategic incentive can outweigh the usual distortionary effects of holdup problems...
-
作者：Stovall, John E.
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：We impose the axiom Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives on division rules for the conflicting claims problem. With the addition of Consistency and Resource Monotonicity, this characterizes a family of rules which can be described in three different but intuitive ways. First, a rule is identified with a fixed monotone path in the space of awards, and for a given claims vector, the path of awards for that claims vector is simply the monotone path truncated by the claims vector. Second, a rul...
-
作者：Mishra, Debasis; Pramanik, Anup; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; University of Osaka; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：We consider implementation of a deterministic allocation rule using transfers in quasi-linear private values environments. We show that in multidimensional single peaked type spaces, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it satisfies a familiar and simple condition called 2-cycle monotonicity. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Takahashi, Satoru; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Bristol
摘要：We propose a notion of selecting rationalizable actions by perturbing players' higher-order beliefs, which we call robust selection. Similarly to WY selection [28], robust selection generalizes the idea behind the equilibrium selection in the email game [27] and the global game [3]. In contrast to WY selection, however, we require selection to be robust to misspecifications of payoffs. Robust selection is a strong notion in the sense that, among types with multiple rationalizable actions, almo...
-
作者：Kredler, Matthias
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：I introduce endogenous human-capital accumulation into an infinite-horizon version of Chari and Hopenhayn's (1991) [4] vintage-human-capital model. Returns to skill and tenure premia are highest in young vintages, where skill is scarcest and agents accumulate human capital fastest. As the vintage ages, the skill premium decreases and vanishes entirely upon vintage death. Workers run through cycles of human-capital accumulation: their wages rise as they accumulate skill, undergo downward pressu...
-
作者：Oehmke, Martin
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Defaults of financial institutions can cause large, disorderly liquidations of repo collateral. This paper analyzes the dynamics of such liquidations. The model shows that (i) the equilibrium price of the collateral asset can overshoot; (ii) the creditor structure in repo lending involves a fundamental trade-off between risk sharing and inefficient rushing for the exits by competing sellers of collateral; (iii) repo lenders should take into account creditor structure, strategic interaction, an...
-
作者：Monzon, Ignacio; Rapp, Michael
作者单位：Collegio Carlo Alberto; Australian National University
摘要：Observational learning is typically examined when agents have precise information about their position in the sequence of play. We present a model in which agents are uncertain about their positions. Agents sample the decisions of past individuals and receive a private signal about the state of the world. We show that social learning is robust to position uncertainty. Under any sampling rule satisfying a stationarity assumption, learning is complete if signal strength is unbounded. In cases wi...
-
作者：Alon, Shiri; Schmeidler, David
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Reichman University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：The Maxmin Expected Utility decision rule suggests that the decision maker can be characterized by a utility function and a set of prior probabilities, such that the chosen act maximizes the minimal expected utility, where the minimum is taken over the priors in the set. Gilboa and Schmeidler axiomatized the maxmin decision rule in an environment where acts map states of nature into simple lotteries over a set of consequences. This approach presumes that objective probabilities exist, and, fur...
