The role of commitment in bilateral trade

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gerardi, Dino; Hoerner, Johannes; Maestri, Lucas
• 署名单位: University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.017
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 578-603
• 关键词: Bargaining; mechanism design; Market for lemons

摘要

This paper characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent values when the informed party makes all offers, as discounting vanishes. The seller of a good is informed of its quality, which affects both his cost and the buyer's valuation, but the buyer is not. To characterize this payoff set, we derive an upper bound, using mechanism design with limited commitment. We then prove that this upper bound is tight, by showing that all its extreme points are equilibrium payoffs. Our results shed light on the role of different forms of commitment in bargaining. In particular, they imply that the buyer's inability to commit before observing the terms of trade is what precludes efficiency. (c) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.