Optimal disclosure policy and undue diligence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andolfatto, David; Berentsen, Aleksander; Waller, Christopher
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Simon Fraser University; University of Basel; University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.02.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 128-152
• 关键词: Disclosure policy; Undue diligence; risk-sharing; Intertemporal trade; limited commitment

摘要

Information about asset quality is often not disclosed to asset markets. What principles determine when a financial regulator should disclose or withhold information? We explore this question using a risk-sharing model with intertemporal trade and limited commitment. Information about future asset returns is available to society, but legislation dictates whether this information is disclosed or not. In our environment, nondisclosure is generally desirable except when individuals can access hidden information what we call undue diligence at sufficiently low cost. Ironically, information disclosure is desirable only when individuals have a strong incentive to discover it for themselves. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.