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作者：Szkup, Michal; Trevino, Isabel
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We study costly information acquisition in global games of regime change (that is, coordination games where payoffs are discontinuous in the unobserved state and in the agents' average action). We show that only symmetric equilibria exist and provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness. We then characterize the value of information in these games and link it to the underlying parameters of the model. We investigate equilibrium efficiency, complementarities in information choices, and the trad...
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作者：Bognar, Katalin; Boergers, Tilman; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study optimal dynamic voting procedures when voting is costly. For a highly stylized specification of our model with private values, two alternatives, and binary, equally likely types we show the optimality of a voting procedure that combines two main elements: (i) there is an arbitrarily chosen default decision and abstention is interpreted as a vote in favor of the default; (ii) voting is sequential and is terminated when a supermajority requirement, which declines over time, is met. We s...
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作者：Holmberg, Par; Willems, Bert
作者单位：Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); University of Cambridge; Tilburg University
摘要：We demonstrate how commodity producers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, producers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete in supply functions. In equilibrium, producers sell forward contracts and buy call options to commit to downward sloping supply functions. Although this strategy is risky, it is profitable because it reduces the elasticity of the residual demand of competitors who respond...
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作者：Larson, Nathan
作者单位：American University
摘要：We model normal-quadratic social learning with agents who observe a summary statistic over past actions, rather than complete action histories. Because an agent with a summary statistic cannot correct for the fact that earlier actions influenced later ones, even a small presence of old actions in the statistic can introduce very persistent errors. Depending on how fast these old actions fade from view, social learning can either be as fast as if agents' private information were pooled (rate n)...
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作者：Wagner, Christoph; Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Troegr, Thomas
作者单位：University of Bonn; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Mannheim
摘要：We consider a principal agent moral-hazard problem with risk-neutral parties and no limited liability in which the principal has private information. The principal's private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented outcome. These distortions can explain, e.g., efficiency wages (Beaudry, 1994) and muted incentives (Inderst, 2001). We show that in a large class of environments these distortions vanish if the principal is allowed to offer sufficiently rich con...
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作者：Yang, Chih-Chun
作者单位：Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：Brandenburger et al. (2008a) show that rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR) is impossible in a complete and continuous type structure. We show, by introducing an alternative notion of assumption, weak assumption, that rationality and common weak assumption of rationality (RCWAR) is possible in a complete and continuous type structure. This possibility result provides an epistemic characterization for iterative admissibility. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Yang, Ming
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：We study flexible information acquisition in a coordination game. Flexible acquisition means that players choose not only how much but also what kind of information to acquire. Information acquisition has a cost proportional to reduction of entropy. Hence, players will collect the information most relevant to their welfare but can be rationally inattentive to other aspects of the fundamental. When information is cheap, this flexibility enables players to acquire information that makes efficien...
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作者：Pin, Paolo; Rogers, Brian W.
作者单位：University of Siena; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We study the incentive to cooperate in a society comprised of citizens and immigrants. The level of cooperation is governed by a steady state under population dynamics, along with the behavior of individual citizens and immigrants. We provide an equilibrium characterization, exhibiting a uniquely determined positive level of cooperation in society. We then use this framework to study the impact of government programs aimed at punishing immigrants who defect. When agents produce offspring, we s...
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作者：Antinolfi, Gaetano; Carli, Francesco
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Universidade Catolica Portuguesa; Deakin University
摘要：We study dynamic contracts between a lender and a borrower in the presence of costly state verification and hidden effort. We prove three results. Costly monitoring is employed by the lender to optimally limit history dependence and prevent future inefficient termination of the relationship. Due to interaction between costly monitoring and dynamic incentives, the probability of monitoring may fail to be monotone in the borrower's reservation utility. Finally, following the interpretation of th...
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作者：Khalmetski, Kiryl; Ockenfels, Axel; Werner, Peter
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Cologne; University of Cologne
摘要：People do not only feel guilt from not living up to others' expectations (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that generalizes the guilt aversion model to capture the possibility of positive surprises when making gifts. A model extension allows decision makers to care about others' attribution of intentions behind surprises. We test the model in a series of dictator game experiments. We find a strong causal effect of recipients' expectations o...
