Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wagner, Christoph; Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Troegr, Thomas
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.004
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 280-289
• 关键词: Information rents; informed principal; mechanism design; moral hazard; signaling

摘要

We consider a principal agent moral-hazard problem with risk-neutral parties and no limited liability in which the principal has private information. The principal's private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented outcome. These distortions can explain, e.g., efficiency wages (Beaudry, 1994) and muted incentives (Inderst, 2001). We show that in a large class of environments these distortions vanish if the principal is allowed to offer sufficiently rich contracts. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.