Surprising gifts: Theory and laboratory evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Khalmetski, Kiryl; Ockenfels, Axel; Werner, Peter
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Cologne; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.008
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 163-208
• 关键词: Guilt aversion; Surprise seeking; dictator game; Consensus effect

摘要

People do not only feel guilt from not living up to others' expectations (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that generalizes the guilt aversion model to capture the possibility of positive surprises when making gifts. A model extension allows decision makers to care about others' attribution of intentions behind surprises. We test the model in a series of dictator game experiments. We find a strong causal effect of recipients' expectations on dictators' transfers. Moreover, in line with our model, the correlation between transfers and expectations can be both positive and negative, obscuring the effect in the aggregate. Finally, we provide evidence that dictators care about what recipients know about the intentions behind surprises. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.