Inertia in social learning from a summary statistic
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Larson, Nathan
署名单位:
American University
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN:
0022-0531
DOI:
10.1016/j.jet.2015.06.003
发表日期:
2015
页码:
596-626
关键词:
Social learning
asymptotics
Slow learning
Echo chamber
摘要:
We model normal-quadratic social learning with agents who observe a summary statistic over past actions, rather than complete action histories. Because an agent with a summary statistic cannot correct for the fact that earlier actions influenced later ones, even a small presence of old actions in the statistic can introduce very persistent errors. Depending on how fast these old actions fade from view, social learning can either be as fast as if agents' private information were pooled (rate n) or it can slow to a crawl (rate ln n). Consistent with Vives (1993), the fastest possible rate of learning falls to rate n((1/3)) if actions are also observed with noise, but may be much slower. Increasing the sample size of the summary statistic does not lead to faster asymptotic learning and may reduce short run welfare. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.