Cooperation, punishment and immigration

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pin, Paolo; Rogers, Brian W.
• 署名单位: University of Siena; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.002
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 72-101
• 关键词: Dynamic games; network formation; Social behavior

摘要

We study the incentive to cooperate in a society comprised of citizens and immigrants. The level of cooperation is governed by a steady state under population dynamics, along with the behavior of individual citizens and immigrants. We provide an equilibrium characterization, exhibiting a uniquely determined positive level of cooperation in society. We then use this framework to study the impact of government programs aimed at punishing immigrants who defect. When agents produce offspring, we show that a consequence of such punishment is that, while the incentive for immigrants to defect decreases, there is an equilibrium substitution effect whereby citizens realize an increased incentive to defect. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.