Coordination with flexible information acquisition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yang, Ming
• 署名单位: Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.017
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 721-738
• 关键词: Coordination game; Flexible information acquisition; rational inattention

摘要

We study flexible information acquisition in a coordination game. Flexible acquisition means that players choose not only how much but also what kind of information to acquire. Information acquisition has a cost proportional to reduction of entropy. Hence, players will collect the information most relevant to their welfare but can be rationally inattentive to other aspects of the fundamental. When information is cheap, this flexibility enables players to acquire information that makes efficient coordination possible, which also leads to multiple equilibria. This result contrasts with the global game literature, where information structure is less flexible and cheap information leads to a unique equilibrium with inefficient coordination. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.