An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lambert, Nicolas S.; Langford, John; Vaughan, Jennifer Wortman; Chen, Yiling; Reeves, Daniel M.; Shoham, Yoav; Pennock, David M.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Microsoft; Microsoft; Harvard University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.012
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 389-416
• 关键词: Betting market; Wagering mechanism; Parimutuel betting; Scoring rule; belief elicitation; Prediction market

摘要

We construct a budget-balanced wagering mechanism that flexibly extracts information about event probabilities, as well as the mean, median, and other statistics from a group of individuals whose beliefs are immutable to the actions of others. We show how our mechanism, called the Brier betting mechanism, arises naturally from a modified parimutuel betting market. We prove that it is essentially the unique wagering mechanism that is anonymous, proportional, sybilproof and homogeneous. While the Brier betting mechanism is designed for individuals with immutable beliefs, we find that it continues to perform well even for Bayesian individuals who learn from the actions of others. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.