On the Markovian efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Colombo, Luca; Labrecciosa, Paola
• 署名单位: Deakin University; Monash University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.007
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 332-358
• 关键词: Closed-Loop Nash Equilibria; market efficiency; product differentiation; Productive asset oligopoly

摘要

We characterize and compare closed-loop (feedback) price and quantity strategies within a full-fledged dynamic model of oligopolistic competition in which production requires exploitation of a renewable productive asset. Unlike previous papers on the strategic exploitation of productive assets, we allow for imperfect product substitutability, which enables us to deal with price competition. We show that the traditional result that the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the Cournot equilibrium does not necessarily hold in a Markovian environment, either in the short-run or at the stationary equilibrium, or using the discounted sum of welfare as a criterion for relative efficiency. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.