Sequential information disclosure in auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergemann, Dirk; Wambach, Achim
• 署名单位: Yale University; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.004
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1074-1095
• 关键词: Independent private value auction; Sequential disclosure; ascending auctions; information structure; Interim equilibrium; Posterior equilibrium

摘要

We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement an ascending price auction in which each losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning bidder's information is truncated from below. As the auction ends, the winning bidder only has limited information, namely that his valuation is sufficiently high to win the auction. The sequential mechanism implements the allocation of the handicap auction of Eso and Szentes (2007) but strengthens the participation constraints of the bidders from interim to posterior constraints. Due to the limited disclosure of information, the participation constraints (and incentive constraints) of all the bidders are satisfied with respect to all information revealed by the mechanism. In the special case in which the bidders have no private information initially, the seller can extract the entire surplus. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.