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作者：Barlevy, Gadi; Bird, Daniel; Fershtman, Daniel; Weiss, David
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Tel Aviv University; Emory University
摘要：This paper examines whether the two key functions of central banks-ensuring price stability and lending during crises-necessarily conflict. We develop a nominal model of bank runs a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in which individuals can store the money they withdraw under the mattress. In this setting, lending of last resort need not be inflationary. Whether it is depends on the interest rates the central bank charges on its loans. Our results suggest that the central bank must not charge a rat...
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作者：Mueller-Frank, Manuel
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：We study the impact of misinformation in a model of boundedly rational opinion formation in a social network. We capture misinformation via misspecified prior beliefs and consider networks that contain agents with differing social learning sophistication: identity social learners and quasi-Bayesian social learners. An attractive feature of the underlying heuristics is that in the baseline case absent misinformation both coincide with DeGroot updating, the arguably canonical boundedly rational ...
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作者：Alcalde, Jose; Peris, Josep E.
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：We prove that the Boston mechanism designed by Bogomolnaia [J. Econ. Theory 158 (2015) 308-318] to solve the random assignment problem fails to be lexicographically strategy-proof. Consequently, an open question emerges: Is the Serial rule the unique solution satisfying envyfreeness, efficiency and strategy-proofness on the lexicographic preference domain extension for lotteries?
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作者：Huang, Wenqian; Zhu, Haoxiang
作者单位：Bank for International Settlements (BIS); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Central counterparties (CCPs) are systemically important. When a clearing member defaults, the CCP sells the defaulted portfolio to surviving members in an auction, and losses, if any, are partly absorbed by a cash pool prefunded by the surviving members. We propose a tractable auction model that incorporates this salient feature. We find that juniorization - the CCP first uses prefunded cash of members who submit bad bids - increases the auction price. However, too aggressive juniorization ca...
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作者：Tian, Jianrong
作者单位：Peking University
摘要：Informational separability occurs when information decreases as the result of suppressing information that differentiates a subset of states in experiments. With multiple states, informational separability leads to entropy measures. Its implications in multiple different contexts are discussed, including segregation measurement, inference with partial information, and rational inattention.
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作者：Kobielarz, Michal L.
作者单位：KU Leuven
摘要：The dwindling popularity of globalization and international cooperation poses the issue of exiting an international union. An individually made exit decision is inefficient, as it neglects the losses of the other members. Fiscal transfers inside the union eliminate socially inefficient exits and restore the first-best outcome. When fiscal transfers are impossible, the union benefits from introducing exit costs during the formation process. Those costs are Pareto-optimal despite being a deadwei...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We characterize which distributions over the empirical distribution of posterior beliefs in the population are feasible. We apply this result in several domains. First, we study the problem of maximizing the polarization beliefs in a population. Second, we provide a characterization of the feasible agent-symmetric product distributions...
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作者：Staab, Manuel
作者单位：University of Queensland
摘要：I study the interaction of two forces in the formation of social groups: the preference for high quality peers and the desire for status among one's peers. I examine their equilibrium effects under different market structures and find that status concern reduces the potential for and benefit of sorting- both for a social planner and a monopolist- but the interaction between preference for quality and status can make the exclusion of some agents a second-best outcome. Even in settings with comp...
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作者：Ball, Ian; Gao, Xin
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Birmingham
摘要：A principal delegates decisions to a biased agent. Payoffs depend on a state that the principal cannot observe. Initially, the agent does not observe the state, but he can acquire information about it at a cost. We characterize the principal's optimal delegation set. This set features a cap on high decisions and a gap around the agent's ex ante favorite decision. The set may even induce ex -post Pareto-dominated decisions. Under certain conditions on the cost of information acquisition, we sho...
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作者：Dong, Miaomiao; Mayskaya, Tatiana
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We study how a reduction in communication cost affects equilibrium diversity (in expertise) in hiring decisions. The key trade-off is that, while hiring a more diverse team may enlarge the team's pool of knowledge, it also makes communication between the hired experts more challenging. Equilibrium diversity balances this trade-off. We find that equilibrium diversity may exhibit a U-shape relationship with communication cost, reaching its lowest point at moderate cost values, where experts' inc...
