Benefiting from bias: Delegating to encourage information acquisition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ball, Ian; Gao, Xin
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Birmingham
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105816
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: delegation; information acquisition; Benefiting from bias

摘要

A principal delegates decisions to a biased agent. Payoffs depend on a state that the principal cannot observe. Initially, the agent does not observe the state, but he can acquire information about it at a cost. We characterize the principal's optimal delegation set. This set features a cap on high decisions and a gap around the agent's ex ante favorite decision. The set may even induce ex -post Pareto-dominated decisions. Under certain conditions on the cost of information acquisition, we show that the principal prefers delegating to an agent with a small bias than to an unbiased agent.