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作者：Menuet, Maxime; Minea, Alexandru; Villieu, Patrick
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Cote d'Azur; IPAG Business School; University of Bucharest; Carleton University; Universite de Orleans
摘要：This paper introduces a fiscal feedback rule (FFR) in an endogenous growth model with public debt dynamics. We assume that part of the debt burden is covered by tax increases (we name this sterilization), while the remaining part is financed by issuing new debt. We show that while low sterilization does not ensure the existence of a long -run steady state, high sterilization can lead to multiple steady states and aggregate instability in the form of local and global indeterminacy, potentially ...
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作者：Li, Yunan; Zhang, Xingtan
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：An imperfectly informed mediator (or mechanism designer) must make a decision on behalf of a group of agents, who are privately informed about their valuations attached to the decision. The mediator chooses a mechanism before observing a signal about the agents' valuations and commits to truthfully using this information in the mechanism. We give a necessary and sufficient condition on the mediator's information under which the ex post efficient decision rule can be implemented by an ex ante b...
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作者：Blume, Andreas; Noussair, Charles N.; Ye, Bohan
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：Absence of a shared language is an evident barrier to effective communication. Lack of common knowledge of what is shared is more insidious and a potential source of misunderstandings. We induce lack of common knowledge of a shared language in a sender -receiver game experiment by letting the availability of messages with focal meanings be uncertain. We consider an environment in which agents agree on the optimal action in every state of the world, there are equilibria in which messages with f...
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作者：Bonatti, Alessandro; Dahleh, Munther; Horel, Thibaut; Nouripour, Amir
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information about which a single data seller owns some payoff-relevant information. The seller faces a joint information-and mechanism-design problem: deciding which information to sell, while eliciting the buyers' types and imposing payments. We derive the welfare-and revenue-optimal mechanisms for a class of games with binary actions and states. Our results highlight the critical properties of selling information in competitive environments: (i) th...
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作者：Severinov, Sergei; Virag, Gabor
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga
摘要：This paper endogenizes the decision whether to post a mechanism or to participate in another trader's mechanism in a competing mechanisms environment. With a population of heterogeneous buyers and sellers facing standard search frictions, each trader in our market has to decide whether to post a mechanism or to visit a mechanism posted by a trader on the other side of the market. We show that the equilibrium in this market is unique and is constrained efficient. Inefficient traders (low -value...
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作者：Wang, Zichang
作者单位：Xiamen University; Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：We generalize Blackwell's informativeness order to ambiguous experiments. A decision maker might view a statistical experiment as ambiguous if she faces uncertainty about the data generating process for its signals. Formally, an ambiguous experiment is modeled as a mapping from an auxiliary state space to the set of unambiguous experiments. Each auxiliary state corresponds to a possible data generating process. We show that one ambiguous experiment is preferred to another by every decision mak...
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作者：Geffner, Ivan; Halpern, Joseph Y.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Cornell University
摘要：We consider k-resilient sequential equilibria , strategy profiles where no player in a coalition of at most k players believes that it can increase its utility by deviating, regardless of its local state. We prove that all k-resilient sequential equilibria that can be implemented with a trusted mediator can also be implemented without the mediator if n > 3k. k . These results match the lower bounds given by Abraham et al. (2008) for implementing a Nash equilibrium without a mediator (which are...
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作者：Chien, Yili; Wen, Yi
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：This paper makes two fundamental contributions: (i) We prove that the interior Ramsey steady state commonly assumed in the literature may not exist in a standard Aiyagari model-in particular, a steady state with the modified golden rule and a positive capital tax is shown to be feasible but not optimal under conventional parameter values for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. (ii) We design a modified, analytically tractable version of the standard Aiyagari model to reveal the neces...
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作者：Heydari, Pedram
作者单位：Northeastern University
摘要：I provide a model of deliberate stochastic choice over acts (state -contingent payoffs). In this model, the decision maker finds randomization desirable since it reduces responsibility and regret after the state uncertainty resolves. I provide an axiomatic characterization of stochastic choices compatible with this model. I also discuss the comparative statics and some behavioral implications of the model and outline potential avenues for extending and generalizing the model.
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作者：Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay
作者单位：University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Rumors of a shortage may create higher-order uncertainty and cause panic buying even when there is no real shortage and most consumers are aware of this fact. We study the role of prices in alleviating, or even preventing, panic buying caused by such rumors. Under some circumstances, flexible prices fail to do so and panic buying is the unique equilibrium outcome. In our model consumers do not know their future tastes perfectly and panic buying reduces welfare because consumers now buy with on...
