-
作者：Teh, Christopher; Wang, Chengsi; Watanabe, Makoto
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Monash University; Kyoto University
摘要：This paper explores the relationship between market accessibility and various participants' welfare in an intermediated directed-search market. For a general class of meeting technologies, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which efficiency requires imperfect accessibility, such that each seller's listing is only observed by some but not all buyers. We show that the platform optimally implements the efficient outcome, but fully extracts surplus from the transactions it inter...
-
作者：Burkett, Justin; Rosenthal, Maxwell
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：We propose a prior-free model of incentive contracting in which the principal's beliefs about the agent's production technology are characterized by revealed preference data. The principal and the agent are each financially risk neutral and the agent's preferences are understood to be quasilinear in effort. Prior to contracting with the agent, the principal observes the output produced by a population of identical agents in best response to finitely many exogenously-specified contracts. She vi...
-
作者：Eckel, Carsten; Yeaple, Stephen R.
作者单位：University of Munich; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：A growing empirical literature attributes much of the productivity advantages of large, superstar firms to their adoption of best practice management techniques that allow them to better identify and use talented workers. The reasons for the incomplete adoption of these structured management practices (SMPs) and their welfare implications are not well understood. This paper provides a positive and normative analysis of these issues in a theoretical framework in which SMPs induce sorting of tal...
-
作者：Guimaraes, Bernardo; Pannella, Pierluca
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：This paper argues that short selling might give rise to bubbles that would otherwise not exist. An asset with zero fundamental value might be traded at a positive price by rational agents. We call it a short-covering bubble because it is sustained by short-sellers covering their positions. Agents trade according to their beliefs on how long the bubble will persist.
-
作者：Sadowski, Philipp; Sarver, Todd
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：We enrich an evolutionary model with common and idiosyncratic uncertainty as in Robson (1996) by allowing for hidden actions (or phenotypic flexibility). In contexts where common uncertainty is ambiguous and idiosyncratic uncertainty is risky, the model generates both ambiguity aversion and non-expected-utility preferences for risk, thereby providing a link between the two types of behavior. While the general evolutionarily optimal objective function does not have an obvious similarity to func...
-
作者：Kotowski, Maciej H.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：Many two-sided matching markets involve multiperiod interaction. Traditional cooperative solutions, such as pairwise stability or the core, often identify unintuitive outcomes (or are empty) when applied to such markets. As an alternative, this study proposes the criterion of perfect astability. An outcome is perfect a-stable if no coalition prefers an alternative assignment in any period that is superior for all plausible market continuations. The solution posits that agents have foresight, b...
-
作者：Bramoulle, Yann; Genicot, Garance
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Georgetown University
摘要：This paper studies the dynamics of information diffusion within networks, encompassing both general and targeted dissemination. We first characterize the theoretical foundations of diffusion centrality. Next, we introduce two extensions of diffusion centrality: targeting centrality and reachability, , that we believe to better capture situations involving targeted requests. We derive general explicit formulas for the computation of these novel centrality measures.
-
作者：Bochet, Olivier; Sakai, Toyotaka; Thomson, William
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Keio University; University of Rochester
摘要：For the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of a commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences, we study the consequences of manipulation for several families of rules that are not strategy-proof. Given a rule and a true preference profile, we consider the induced direct revelation game, and characterize its equilibrium allocations in terms of the profile. Our results are unequivocal: for any rule we consider, and for each true preference profile, there is a uniqu...
-
作者：Han, Xiang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：As a random allocation rule for indivisible object allocation under weak priorities, deferred acceptance with single tie -breaking (DA-STB) is not ex -post constrained efficient. We first observe that it also fails to satisfy equal -top fairness, which requires that two agents be assigned their common top choice with equal probability if they have equal priority for it. Then, it is shown that DA-STB is ex -post constrained efficient, if and only if it is equal -top fair, if and only if the pri...
-
作者：Ritzberger, Klaus; Tsomocos, Dimitrios P.
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：In a general equilibrium model with time and uncertainty the possibility of bankruptcy cannot be excluded in general, when short sale constraints are too loose. Tight short trading constraints, on the other hand, are inefficient. Bankruptcies turn security payoffs endogenous and destroy convexity of the induced preferences over portfolios. The latter raises existence issues for competitive equilibrium, as illustrated in this paper by an example.
