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作者：Han, Leyla Jianyu; Kasa, Kenneth; Luo, Yulei
作者单位：Boston University; Simon Fraser University; University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper incorporates ambiguity and information processing constraints into the He and Krishnamurthy (2012) model of intermediary asset pricing. Financial intermediaries possess greater information processing capacity than households. In response, households optimally choose to delegate their investment decisions. The contractual relationship between households and intermediaries is subject to a moral hazard friction, which results in a financial constraint. We show that ambiguity aversion n...
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作者：Anderson, Robert M.; Duanmu, Haosui; Ghosh, Aniruddha; Khan, M. Ali
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Harbin Institute of Technology; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：Model misspecification is a critical issue in many areas of economics. In the context of misspecified Markov Decision Processes, Esponda and Pouzo (2021) defined the notion of BerkNash equilibrium and established its existence with finite state and action spaces. However, many substantive applications (including two of the three motivating examples presented by Esponda and Pouzo) involve continuous state or action spaces, and are thus not covered by the EspondaPouzo existence theorem. We exten...
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作者：Chan, Jenny
摘要：Sentiments, or beliefs about aggregate demand, can be self-fulfilling in models departing slightly from the complete information benchmark in the New Keynesian framework. Through its effect on aggregate variables, the policy stance determines the degree of complementarity in firms' production (pricing) decisions and consequently, the precision of endogenous signals that firms receive. As a result, aggregate fluctuations can be driven by both fundamental and non-fundamental shocks. The distribu...
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作者：Wu, Liangjie
摘要：I study the labor market implications of an equilibrium search model with flexible degrees of information availability, which nests the random and directed search models as special cases. Workers have limited information about the payoffs of applying to different firms. Firms use wages to attract workers and mediate externalities among applicants. Limited information interacts with the allocative role of wages, leading to new predictions. Reducing information friction has non -monotonic impact...
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作者：Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco; Ulku, Levent
作者单位：University of Bristol; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：Online technologies enable a host of observable acts, such as wishlisting, that do not quite amount to choice meant as a final selection. Rather, they express interest and a positive attitude towards an item. We gather this type of behaviour under the term approval . With items presented as a list, we propose a model of approval. We completely characterise the model in terms of simple properties of observed approval data. We introduce and study the problem of list design . This captures situat...
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作者：Habu, Takuma; Lipnowski, Elliot; Ravid, Doron
作者单位：Cornell University; Yale University; University of Chicago
摘要：We revisit the canonical model of repeated games with two patient players, observable actions, and one-sided incomplete information, and make the substantive assumption that the informed player's preference is state independent. We show the informed player can attain a payoff in equilibrium if and only if she can attain it in the simple class of equilibria first studied by Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns (1968), in which the initial stages are used only for revealing information, and no further ...
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作者：Bayona, Anna; Manzano, Carolina
作者单位：Universitat Ramon Llull; Escuela Superior de Administracion y Direccion de Empresas (ESADE); Universitat Rovira i Virgili
摘要：We study a market with sellers that compete in supply functions, face an elastic demand, and have imperfect cost information. In our model, sellers neglect some informational content of the price. In order to capture this feature, we use the cursed expectations equilibrium concept. In the linear- quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear supply functions exists and derives some comparative statics results. Compared to markets with f...
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作者：Deimen, Inga; Szalay, Dezso
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Bonn
摘要：We perform distributional comparative statics in a cheap talk model of adaptation. Receiver borne adaptation costs drive a wedge between the objectives of sender and receiver that is increasing in the magnitude of adaptation. We allow for infinite supports with infinite disagreement at the extremes and compare communication to unconstrained delegation. We study increases in risk that arise from transformations of the state variable. We find that linear transformations (implying increases in va...
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作者：Jeong, Daeyoung; Shin, Euncheol
作者单位：Yonsei University
摘要：We examine an influence designer's optimal intervention in the presence of social learning in a network. Before learning begins, the designer alters initial opinions of agents within the network to shift their ultimate opinions to be as close as possible to the target opinions. By decomposing the influence matrix, which summarizes the learning structure, we transform the designer's problem into one with an orthogonal basis. This transformation allows us to characterize optimal interventions un...
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作者：Lin, Po-Hsuan; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：University of Virginia; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In the cognitive hierarchy (CH) framework, players in a game have heterogeneous levels of strategic sophistication. Each player believes that other players in the game are less sophisticated, and these beliefs correspond to the truncated distribution of a true distribution of levels. We develop the dynamic cognitive hierarchy (DCH) solution by extending the CH framework to games in extensive form. Initial beliefs are updated as the history of play provides information about players' levels of ...
