Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule (vol 158, pg 308, 2015)

• 成果类型: Correction
• 署名作者: Alcalde, Jose; Peris, Josep E.
• 署名单位: Universitat d'Alacant
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105845
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Random assignment; Serial rule; boston mechanism; strategy-proofness

摘要

We prove that the Boston mechanism designed by Bogomolnaia [J. Econ. Theory 158 (2015) 308-318] to solve the random assignment problem fails to be lexicographically strategy-proof. Consequently, an open question emerges: Is the Serial rule the unique solution satisfying envyfreeness, efficiency and strategy-proofness on the lexicographic preference domain extension for lotteries?