Consistency and communication in committees

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Deimen, Inga; Ketelaar, Felix; Le Quement, Mark T.
• 署名单位: University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.004
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 24-35
• 关键词: committees; voting; information aggregation; cheap talk

摘要

We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.