Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter A.; Wolthoff, Ronald P.
• 署名单位: Tongji University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.03.002
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 453-473
• 关键词: Search frictions; Matching function; Meeting technology; competing mechanisms; Heterogeneity

摘要

In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market with all agents is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call joint concavity. Both outcomes can be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. Finally, we compare joint concavity to two other properties of meeting technologies, invariance and non-rivalry, and explain the differences. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.