Dynamic persuasion

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Honryo, Takakazu
• 署名单位: Doshisha University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.007
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 36-58
• 关键词: communication; persuasion; DYNAMICS

摘要

This paper constructs a model of dynamic persuasion. A sender attempts to persuade a decision maker (DM) by sequentially revealing verifiable arguments, but this incurs communication costs. In equilibrium, the sender decides when to give up, and the DM decides when to make a decision. We characterize the DM-optimal equilibrium. We further show that the DM gains from making a stochastic commitment, and provide a condition under which it also makes the sender better-off. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.