The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gaudeul, Alexia; Keser, Claudia; Muller, Stephan
• 署名单位: University of Gottingen; University of Gottingen
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.004
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 251-277
• 关键词: indirect reciprocity; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; experiment

摘要

We theoretically and experimentally study the evolution of strategies reflecting different moral judgments under indirect reciprocity. We fully characterize the asymptotically stable sets of rest points. In all cooperative rest points multiple strategies coexist. This offers an explanation for the heterogeneity in moral judgments among humans. The behavior prescribed by the predicted strategies can rationalize the design of real-life reputation systems, which are set up to resolve problems of moral hazard. In our laboratory experiment, we find that more than 75% of participants play strategies that belong to the predicted set of strategies. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.